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Bailey v. United States: Another Win for 
that “Doggone Fourth Amendment”
Daniel Epps*
More than 30 years ago, Michigan v. Summers established a bright-
line rule that police, when executing a search warrant for contraband 
at a home, may detain occupants of the residence for the duration of 
the search.1 That rule is a categorical exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment’s general prohibition on detentions—or “seizures” of the per-
son—that are not based on probable cause. This year, in Bailey v. 
United States, the Supreme Court refused to extend the Summers rule 
further, holding that police have no categorical power to detain oc-
cupants who have left the immediate vicinity of the premises being 
searched.2 
Bailey got the bottom-line result right. The probable-cause require-
ment is a well-established component of the reasonableness man-
dated by the Fourth Amendment. The government could point to no 
legitimate interest that would justify a limited exception from that 
requirement without swallowing it entirely. By declining to extend 
the Summers rule in Bailey, the Court reaffirmed the probable-cause 
requirement and made clear that it cannot be discarded simply be-
cause it poses inconvenience to police efforts to investigate crime. 
Bailey is in one sense disappointing: Both the majority and Justice 
Antonin Scalia (who filed a separate concurrence) declined to criti-
cize the Summers rule itself, which is broader than necessary in light 
of its legitimate justifications—even though both appeared to rec-
ognize the flaws in Summers’s reasoning. More important, however, 
is what Bailey demonstrates about the current state of search-and-
seizure doctrine as a whole. The Court has in recent years become 
* Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Danielle 
D’Onfro, Garrett Epps, and Matt Owen for helpful feedback.
1 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981).
2 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013). 
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more careful in its analysis of Fourth Amendment issues, requiring 
a tighter fit between exceptions to rules like the probable-cause re-
quirement and their justifications. It now takes the Fourth Amend-
ment more seriously as a source of determinate legal rules, rather 
than as an open-ended invitation to declare what is reasonable under 
all the circumstances of each case. Those who believe that the Fourth 
Amendment should impose meaningful constraints on police action 
should see that as a good development. It guards against the risk 
that judges will effectively render Fourth Amendment protections 
meaningless by discarding them whenever they become inconve-
nient for police. 
Legal Background
 The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” The Supreme Court has 
made clear that the ban on “unreasonable . . .  seizures” means that, 
as a general matter, police may not forcibly detain a person without 
probable cause to believe that he has committed or is committing 
a crime.3 That rule “has roots that are deep in our history.”4 Under 
English common law, peace officers could make warrantless arrests 
only when they had “reasonable grounds to believe” the arrestee 
had committed a felony, and that rule has been incorporated into 
Fourth Amendment doctrine.5
Despite its historical pedigree, however, the probable-cause re-
quirement—like most other Fourth Amendment rules6—has signifi-
cant exceptions. Most notably, Terry v. Ohio7 and its progeny provide 
3 See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); United States v. Watson, 423 
U.S. 411, 416–19 (1976); see also Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). 
4 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959). 
5 See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amend-
ment § 5.1(b), at 15 (2012). There is some historical disagreement over whether war-
rantless misdemeanor arrests were permissible only for breaches of the peace. See At-
water v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
6 See, e.g., Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating 
the Fourth Amendment, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 473, 481 (1991) (“Today, the warrant require-
ment is notable more for its exceptions than its enforcement.”). 
7 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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that when police have “reasonable, articulable suspicion” of criminal 
activity, they may briefly detain an individual for the purpose of 
questioning the individual.8 The Court’s stated rationale for such ex-
ceptions to the “general rule requiring probable cause” is that some 
seizures are “so substantially less intrusive than arrests” that they 
may be justified under a “balancing test” where strong law-enforce-
ment interests are present.9
At issue in Bailey was the scope of one such exception: the rule, 
established in Michigan v. Summers, that police may detain “an occu-
pant of premises being searched for contraband pursuant to a valid 
warrant” during the search.10 In Summers, the police had a warrant to 
search a home for drugs. As they approached the home, they found 
the home’s owner, George Summers, descending the front steps, and 
immediately detained him. After finding narcotics in the basement, 
police arrested Summers. Summers had heroin on his person and 
was charged with drug possession as a result. Because police would 
not have had the chance immediately to arrest Summers had they 
not detained him during the search, the validity of the search of 
Summers’s person depended on the validity of the original deten-
tion. Given that the detention was surely a seizure, and given that 
it was clear that police lacked probable cause to arrest Summers at 
the time he was initially detained, the Court found it necessary to 
consider whether a special exception to the normal probable-cause 
requirement was justified. 
In an opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens, and over the dissent 
of Justice Potter Stewart (joined by Justices William Brennan and 
Thurgood Marshall), the Court concluded that such an exception 
was appropriate as a categorical matter.11 Justice Stevens reached 
that conclusion after assessing the interests at stake and conducting 
a balancing test. 
On the one hand, the Court concluded that detention incident to 
a search warrant was only a minimal intrusion on the liberty and 
privacy of the detained person.12 First, it was of “prime importance” 
8 See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); see also, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491, 498–99 (1983).
9 Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 210. 
10 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981). 
11 Id. at 705.
12 Id. at 701–02.
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that police had obtained a warrant to search for contraband.13 A 
“neutral and detached magistrate had found probable cause to be-
lieve that the law was being violated in [the residence] and had au-
thorized a substantial invasion of the privacy of the persons who 
resided there”; Summers’s detention was “admittedly a significant 
restraint on his liberty,” but it “was surely less intrusive than the 
search itself.”14 Second, the Court reasoned that a detention during 
a search “is not likely to be exploited by the officer or unduly pro-
longed in order to gain more information, because the information 
the officers seek normally will be obtained through the search and 
not through the detention.”15 And finally, the Court determined 
that a detention in the detainee’s “own residence . . . could add only 
minimally to the public stigma associated with the search itself and 
would involve neither the inconvenience nor the indignity associ-
ated with a compelled visit to the police station.”16
The Summers Court identified three “legitimate law enforcement 
interest[s]” weighing heavily in favor of permitting detention.17 First 
and “most obvious” was the “interest in preventing flight in the 
event that incriminating evidence is found.”18 Second was the inter-
est in “minimizing the risk of harm to the officers”; because “the 
execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transac-
tion that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal 
or destroy evidence,” the Court reasoned that “[t]he risk of harm to 
both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers rou-
tinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.”19 Finally, 
the Court thought that allowing detention would facilitate “the or-
derly completion of the search,” because occupants’ “self-interest 
may induce them to open locked doors or locked containers to avoid 
the use of force that is not only damaging to property but may also 
delay the completion of the task at hand.”20 
13 Id. at 701. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 702. 
17 Id.
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 703.
20 Id. at 702–03. 
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In addition, the Court stressed that the “connection of an occu-
pant to th[e] home” being searched pursuant to a warrant gave rise 
to legitimate “suspicion of criminal activity,” thereby providing “an 
objective justification for the detention.”21 Weighing all the relevant 
considerations, the Court held that “a warrant to search for contra-
band founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the lim-
ited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper 
search is conducted.”22
Summers was short on the specifics of permissible detention. Jus-
tice Potter Stewart, in dissent, warned that the majority’s rule would 
permit “a detention of several hours” allowing police to “make the 
person a prisoner in his own home for a potentially very long period 
of time.”23 That prediction proved true when, more than two decades 
later, the Court clarified the reach of the Summers rule in Muehler v. 
Mena.24 There, the Court held that “[i]nherent in Summers’ authoriza-
tion to detain an occupant of the place to be searched is the authority 
to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention.”25 Applying that 
rule, the Court concluded that it was permissible for police to keep 
a home’s occupant in handcuffs for several hours during the course 
of a search (although the Court left open the possibility that the de-
tention could have been unreasonable if it extended longer than the 
duration of the search).26 Several years later, in Los Angeles County v. 
Rettele, the Court ruled that police searching a home pursuant to a 
warrant have the authority, under Summers, to hold the home’s oc-
cupants at gunpoint while securing the premises.27
Summers was also unclear about precisely which “occupants” it al-
lowed police to detain. The Court’s opinion used the term loosely. 
Did it mean to refer only to residents, or did it mean anyone who 
was currently occupying the premises at the time of the search? 
The opinion can be read both ways. A number of the Court’s argu-
ments appear premised on the fact that Summers was detained at 
21 Id. at 703–04.
22 Id. at 705 (footnote omitted). 
23 Summers, 452 U.S. at 711 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
24 544 U.S. 93 (2005).
25 Id. at 98–99.
26 Id. at 100–02. 
27 550 U.S. 609, 613–16 (2007). 
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his own home,28 but some of the opinion’s offered rationales for the 
detention—such as minimizing harm to officers—do not necessar-
ily turn on whether the detained person actually lives at the home 
being searched. There is some disagreement on this question.29 It is 
unlikely, however, that Summers detentions could remain limited to 
owners in practice. Police will not necessarily know whether some-
one is an owner or a mere visitor at the time of detention.30
A related, but distinct, area of uncertainty—and here’s where we 
come to the issue in Bailey—is whether someone can be an “occu-
pant” under Summers after he has left the premises. Here, too, Sum-
mers is ambiguous. The term “occupant” can be plausibly read as 
meaning someone who is presently “occupying” the residence; and 
the Court noted that its rule allowed police to require an occupant 
“to remain” in his home during a search.31 But it also could refer to 
someone who simply lives at the residence. Supporting that reading 
is the fact that Summers himself was seized not while he was inside 
his home, but rather while he was in the process of leaving. Indeed, 
the Court explicitly observed that it did not “view the fact that [Sum-
mers] was leaving his house when the officers arrived to be of con-
stitutional significance.”32
Lower courts predictably divided on this question. A number held 
that police could choose to detain a departing occupant so long as 
they did so “as soon as practicable” after his departure.33 Others 
concluded that the power to detain under Summers did not extend 
28 See, e.g., Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 (“[B]ecause the detention in this case was in 
respondent’s own residence, it could add only minimally to the public stigma associ-
ated with the search itself . . . .”).
29 See Amir Hatem Ali, Note, Following the Bright Line of Michigan v. Summers: A 
Cause for Concern for Advocates of Bright-Line Fourth Amendment Rules, 45 Harv. 
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 483, 497–500 (2010) (noting disagreement in lower courts); LaFave, 
supra note 5, § 4.9(e) at pp. 924–26 & nn.142–44 (same). 
30 In Bailey itself, police detained Bailey’s passenger even though he claimed to be 
a friend whom Bailey was driving home. 133 S. Ct. at 1036. And police did not end 
Bailey’s detention once he denied living at the apartment being searched. Id.
31 Summers, 452 U.S. at 705; see also Brief for Petitioner at 18–19, Bailey v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013) (No. 11-770).
32 Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 n.16. 
33 See, e.g., United States v. Montieth, 662 F.3d 660 (4th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases). 
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beyond the premises themselves.34 Bailey presented an ideal vehicle 
for the resolution of the split. 
Case Background
Like so many other Fourth Amendment cases in recent decades, 
Bailey arose out of a narcotics investigation. Police received a tip from 
an informant who claimed that “a heavy set black male with short hair 
known as Polo” was selling drugs out of a basement apartment in Wy-
andanch, New York.35 Police obtained a warrant to search for a hand-
gun. While the search team was preparing to execute the warrant, de-
tectives observed two men leaving the residence, both of whom fit the 
vague description of “Polo.” The men got in a vehicle and drove away; 
after they had traveled for several hundred feet, the detectives began 
pursuing them while other officers began the search.
Once the two men were approximately one mile away from the 
home, the detectives pulled the vehicle over, ordered the men out, 
frisked them, and handcuffed them. One of the men, Chunon Bailey, 
initially admitted to residing at the basement apartment. When told 
that he was being detained incident to a search warrant for that resi-
dence, Bailey said “I don’t live there. Anything you find there ain’t 
mine, and I’m not cooperating with your investigation.”36 One of the 
keys that was found on Bailey’s person turned out to open the base-
ment apartment.
Bailey was subsequently charged with federal gun and drug of-
fenses; at trial, he sought to suppress his incriminatory statements 
and the apartment key, arguing that his seizure was unreasonable 
and not authorized by Summers.37 The district court denied the mo-
tion, and the Second Circuit affirmed. In an opinion by Judge José 
Cabranes, the court concluded that “the very interests at stake in 
Summers . . . permit detention of an occupant nearby, but outside of, 
the premises” being searched.38 According to the Second Circuit, 
refusing to extend Summers to detentions like Bailey’s “would put 
police officers executing a warrant in an impossible position: when 
34 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Charros, 824 N.E.2d 809 (Mass. 2005). 
35 Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1036 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
36 Id. 
37 Id.
38 United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2011).
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they observe a person of interest leaving a residence for which they 
have a search warrant, they would be required either to detain him 
immediately (risking officer safety and the destruction of evidence) 
or to permit him to leave the scene (risking the inability to detain 
him if incriminating evidence was discovered).”39
The Second Circuit did not, however, see the Summers power as 
limitless; it cautioned that “Summers is not a license for law enforce-
ment to detain ‘occupants’ of premises subject to a search warrant 
anywhere they may be found incident to that search.”40 Instead, in 
the court’s view, Summers established “a duty based on both geo-
graphic and temporal proximity; police must identify an individual 
in the process of leaving the premises subject to search and detain him 
as soon as practicable during the execution of the search.”41 “Because 
the officers acted as soon as reasonably practicable in detaining Bai-
ley once he drove off the premises subject to search . . . his deten-
tion during the valid search of the house did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.”42
The Supreme Court granted Bailey’s petition for certiorari. At the 
merits stage, Bailey placed great emphasis on the Court’s recent de-
cision in Arizona v. Gant.43 Gant was not directly on point as a legal 
matter; the case concerned police authority to search incident to an 
arrest, rather than the power, at issue in Bailey, to detain incident to 
a search. 
The specific issue in Gant was when police can search vehicles in-
cident to an arrest of the driver. Typically, police cannot search a ve-
hicle absent probable cause to believe that it contains contraband (or 
the driver’s consent).44 But the Court’s decision in New York v. Belton45 
had been understood as creating a blanket exception to that rule, 
under which police were permitted to search a vehicle incident to 
arrest whenever the driver was arrested. The Belton rule was osten-
sibly founded upon the rationales of officer safety and preservation 
39 Id.
40 Id. at 208.
41 Id. at 206.
42 Id. at 207. 
43 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
44 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 808–09 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132, 155–56 (1925). 
45 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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of evidence,46 but neither seemed applicable to situations in which 
the police search a vehicle while the arrested driver is handcuffed 
and locked in the back of a squad car. For that reason, Belton became 
subject to serious criticism.47 In Gant, a narrow majority of the Court 
(Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Scalia, David Souter, Clarence 
Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg) effectively overruled the case, 
holding that a search of an automobile incident to arrest is permissi-
ble “only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe 
the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”48
Seeking to build a similar coalition, Bailey invoked Gant at 
every turn. Just as Gant recognized that the Belton rule could not 
be “untether[ed]” from its underlying justifications (preservation of 
evidence and safety of officers), so too should the Court refuse to 
extend Summers beyond the “immediate vicinity” of a home, where 
its rationales no longer apply, Bailey argued.49 Thus, although Gant 
did not deal with the precise issue in Bailey, it nonetheless provided 
a helpful analogy.
The government, for its part, did not take the bait; its brief never 
cited Gant. Instead, the government challenged the premise of Bai-
ley’s argument: Although Bailey had cast the Summers rule as Fourth 
Amendment doctrine’s only categorical rule “that supports the deten-
tion of an individual, solely for ordinary law-enforcement purposes, 
without any degree of individualized suspicion,”50 the government 
stressed language in Summers suggesting that the existence of a 
search warrant gave police “an identifiable and individualized basis 
to detain” a departing occupant of a home to be searched.51 The gov-
ernment strongly contested Bailey’s argument that the “legitimate 
46 The Belton rule was derived from the general search-incident-to-arrest exception 
to the warrant requirement recognized in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), 
which was premised on those two rationales, see id. at 763. 
47 See, e.g., Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 626–29 (2004) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment). 
48 Gant, 556 U.S. at 351. 
49 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 21 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343) (brackets 
omitted). 
50 Id. at 15. 
51 Brief for the United States at 24, Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013) (No. 
11-770) (emphasis omitted). 
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law enforcement interest[s]” recognized by Summers were inapplica-
ble beyond the “immediate vicinity” of the premises being searched; 
it gave special emphasis to the safety rationale, warning that depart-
ing occupants could return to the scene of a search and assault the 
officers present.52
At oral argument, Bailey appeared to have the wind at his back. 
Several justices appeared skeptical of the government’s position. Jus-
tice Anthony Kennedy wondered why the government’s arguments 
would not justify detention of any person with a connection to the 
premises being searched, even if not nearby when the search began.53 
Chief Justice John Roberts questioned whether Summers was right to 
suggest that “you can detain the people because they might want to 
give the officers assistance. Well, if they want to give them assistance, 
they don’t have to be detained.”54 Nothing better summed up the day 
the government was having, however, than Justice Scalia’s response to 
one of the government’s arguments about law-enforcement interests: 
“All law enforcement would be a lot easier if we didn’t have the dog-
gone Fourth Amendment. I mean, the Fourth Amendment is an im-
pediment to law enforcement. Of course it is. There—there’s no doubt 
about that.”55 No one in attendance that day left the courtroom with 
any doubt about Justice Scalia’s view of the case.
The Decision
Predictably, in light of the oral argument, the Supreme Court 
reversed. The Court rejected the Second Circuit’s “as soon as rea-
sonably practicable” rule and instead held that authority to detain 
under Summers extends no further than “the immediate vicinity of 
the premises to be searched.”56 The vote was 6–3. Justice Kennedy 
wrote for the majority, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Scalia, Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan; Justice Stephen 
Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Thomas and Samuel Alito.57 
52 See id. at 35–42.
53 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031 
(2013) (No. 11-770).
54 Id. at 48.
55 Id. at 57. 
56 Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1041. 
57 Interestingly, despite Bailey’s efforts to analogize the case to Gant, not all of the 
justices saw the two cases as similar. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy both 
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Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion reached its holding after ana-
lyzing each of the interests identified by Summers and concluding 
that none of them applied with the same force to individuals who 
have left the premises being searched. Regarding safety to officers, 
the Court acknowledged the possibility that, as the government had 
warned,58 a home’s occupant might return to the premises while 
a search was ongoing.59 The Court’s response, however, was that   
“[o]fficers can and do mitigate that risk, however, by taking routine 
precautions, for instance by erecting barricades or posting someone 
on the perimeter or at the door.”60 Moreover, the government’s ar-
gument proved too much; “[t]he risk . . . that someone could return 
home during the execution of a search warrant is not limited to oc-
cupants who depart shortly before the start of a search.”61
The Court quickly dispensed with the Second Circuit’s argu-
ment that Bailey’s proposed rule would put police in an “impossible 
position.”62 As the Court saw it:
Although the danger of alerting occupants who remain 
inside may be of real concern in some instances . . . this safety 
rationale rests on the false premise that a detention must take 
place. If the officers find that it would be dangerous to detain 
a departing individual in front of a residence, they are not 
required to stop him.63 
Here, Justice Kennedy’s opinion channeled Justice Scalia’s concur-
rence in the judgment in Thornton v. United States,64 a pre-Gant case 
in which cracks in the Belton rule began to show. Responding to the 
argument that “since the officer could have conducted the search at 
the time of arrest (when the suspect was still near the car), he should 
dissented in Gant, but sided with Bailey; Justice Thomas joined the Gant majority but 
dissented in Bailey. 
58 See Brief for the United States, supra note 51, at 35–42.
59 Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1039. 
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2011).
63 Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1031. 
64 541 U.S. 615 (2004). 
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not be penalized for having taken the sensible precaution of secur-
ing the suspect in the squad car first,”65 Justice Scalia explained:
The weakness of this argument is that it assumes that, one 
way or another, the search must take place. But conducting a 
. . . search is not the Government’s right; it is an exception—
justified by necessity—to a rule that would otherwise render 
the search unlawful. If sensible police procedures require that 
suspects be handcuffed and put in squad cars, then police 
should handcuff suspects, put them in squad cars, and not 
conduct the search.66
Justice Kennedy did not cite this  concurrence; having dissented 
in  Gant,  Justice Kennedy may be disinclined to endorse the rea-
soning that led to that decision. But the concurrence’s echoes are 
unmistakable. 
 The majority then explained that the interest in “the orderly com-
pletion of the search” is tied to “the vicinity of the premises to be 
searched.”67 “If occupants are permitted to wander around the prem-
ises,” they could actively interfere with the search; but “[t]hose risks 
are not presented by an occupant who departs beforehand.”68 As for 
Summers’s suggestion that detained occupants could be persuaded to 
open locked containers, “it would have no limiting principle were it 
to be applied to persons beyond the premises of the search.”69
Next was the interest in preventing flight. This interest, one might 
think, would be stronger under facts like those in Bailey than where 
the occupant is found at the premises. If the need to prevent flight 
justifies detaining those who are still present when the search com-
mences, it surely should justify detaining those who have recently 
left (and thus are possibly fleeing) the premises. For this reason, 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion found it necessary essentially 
to redefine the flight interest out of existence. Taking the lead from 
Bailey,70 the Court explained that the prevention-of-flight interest 
65 Id. at 627 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
66 Id. 
67 Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1040.
68 Id. 
69 Id.
70 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 31, at 17–18 (“[Summers] did not suggest that, 
standing alone, the interest in preventing flight would serve as a sufficient basis for a 
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was subordinate to the other two interests recognized in Summers: 
It “serves to preserve the integrity of the search by controlling those 
persons who are on the scene,” but it “does not independently jus-
tify detention of an occupant beyond the immediate vicinity of the 
premises to be searched.”71
Having concluded that Summers’s law-enforcement interests were 
weaker when applied to detentions of recent occupants, the Court 
turned to the interests of the detained individual. Detentions out-
side the home involve “an additional level of intrusiveness,” because 
such public detentions often involve “the additional indignity of a 
compelled transfer back to the premises, giving all the appearances 
of an arrest.”72 In light of its assessment of the balance of interests, 
the Court concluded that “[a] spatial constraint defined by the im-
mediate vicinity of the premises” was a necessary limitation on the 
Summers rule.73 Because Bailey’s detention occurred nowhere near 
the premises, the Court declined to elaborate on how courts should 
define “immediate vicinity,” suggesting only that “[i]n closer cases 
courts can consider a number of factors . . . including the lawful lim-
its of the premises, whether the occupant was within the line of sight 
of his dwelling, the ease of reentry from the occupant’s location, and 
other relevant factors.”74 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, filed a con-
curring opinion. He found the case easy: “[Summers] applies only 
to seizures of ‘occupants’—that is, persons within ‘the immediate 
vicinity of the premises to be searched.’ Bailey was seized a mile 
away. Ergo, Summers cannot sanction Bailey’s detention. It really is 
that simple.”75 He criticized the Second Circuit and the dissenting 
justices for seeking to “replace [Summers’s] straightforward, binary 
inquiry with open-ended balancing.”76 While seeming to defend the 
Summers rule, however, he acknowledged that the Court’s opinion in 
detention. . . .  Instead, the interest in preventing flight is better understood as over-
lapping with, and thereby reinforcing, the other interests supporting the Summers 
rule.”). 
71 Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1040–41.
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 1042. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 1043 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
76 Id. 
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that case was too “expansive,” “setting forth a smorgasbord of law-
enforcement interests assertedly justifying its holding.”77 Because, 
in his view, the interests in preventing flight and in opening locked 
containers were “nothing more than the ordinary interest in investi-
gating crime,” he concluded that “[t]he Summers exception is appro-
priately predicated only on law enforcement’s interest in carrying 
out the search unimpeded by violence or other disruptions.”78
In dissent, Justice Breyer argued that all of the Summers law-en-
forcement interests applied with full force to situations like the one 
in Bailey.79 He focused on two main points. First, he argued that the 
majority failed to provide an “easily administered bright line” but 
would instead “invite[] case-by-case litigation.”80 Second, he con-
tended that allowing police to wait to detain departing occupants 
was the better rule, because departing occupants may be armed or 
may see the police and notify persons inside the home of the impend-
ing search.81 Although acknowledging the majority’s argument that 
police are not required to detain a departing person, Justice Breyer 
opined that police may feel compelled to detain anyone emerging 
from a home prior to the execution of a warrant because they will not 
know if that person has spotted them.82
Analysis
The Need to Ensure That Exceptions Don’t Swallow the Rules
Rights have costs. Enshrining a command into constitutional text 
takes certain options off the table—even where adherence to that 
rule seems inconsistent with some other attractive value. The Con-
frontation Clause forbids the use of testimonial hearsay at a criminal 
trial if the defendant has no opportunity to confront the declarant—
even if the testimony has all the indicia of reliability.83 The Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause bars appeal of an acquittal—even one that is 
77 Id. at 1044. 
78 Id. at 1044–45.
79 Id. at 1046–47 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
80 Id. at 1047. 
81 Id. at 1047–48.
82 Id. at 1048. 
83 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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obviously erroneous.84 The Sixth Amendment insists that juries, not 
judges, determine whether the government has proven the elements 
of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt—even if there is little doubt 
what a properly instructed jury would decide.85 Such commands are 
the product of a constitutional settlement in which it was resolved 
that the overall benefits of adhering to these guarantees are worth 
the costs they produce.
The Fourth Amendment is no different. By barring “unreason-
able” searches and seizures, the amendment does not merely require 
reasonableness in the abstract but enshrines, at least to some extent, 
a particular vision of reasonable police practices into law. An im-
portant part of that vision, even though not explicit in the constitu-
tional text, is the requirement that arrests must be based on probable 
cause.86 That rule has strong historical support and has been repeat-
edly reaffirmed by the Court. And it’s a rule that makes good sense; 
if the ban on unreasonable seizures means anything, it should, under 
normal circumstances, prevent police from depriving a person of his 
liberty without at least some reason to think he has committed a 
crime. That requirement, by its nature, makes law enforcement more 
difficult. But our society decided, when it enshrined the amendment 
84 Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962).
85 Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280–81 (1993). But see Neder v. United States, 
527 U.S. 1, 8–15 (1999) (holding that trial court’s failure to instruct jury on element of 
materiality is susceptible to harmless-error analysis on appeal from conviction). 
86 There is significant disagreement over whether the Fourth Amendment’s reason-
ableness requirement simply constitutionalizes the search-and-seizure rules existing 
in 1791 or instead invites judges to engage in common-law reasoning, with the power 
to fashion rules in light of changed circumstances. Justice Scalia has forcefully ad-
vocated the first position. See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 
60–66 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For opposing views, see, e.g., David A. Sklansky, 
The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1739 (2000); Carol S. 
Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 820 (1997). That 
debate has significant implications about many areas of Fourth Amendment doctrine, 
such as the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First 
Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 762–81 (1994) (arguing that the warrant requirement 
lacks a historical basis). However one comes down on that dispute, it is of no moment 
here. The rule that arrests require probable cause has strong historical roots, see supra 
notes 4 & 5 and accompanying text, but also has strong support in modern practice 
and precedent, see, e.g., Sklansky, supra, at 1764 (noting that the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the probable-cause requirement “when the ahistoric approach to the Fourth 
Amendment was at its apogee”). 
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into law, that those costs were worth the benefits of personal liberty 
and security. 
Precisely because the Fourth Amendment is worded so vaguely, 
however, it poses special difficulties in judicial application. The lan-
guage of reasonableness can make the Fourth Amendment seem like 
an open-ended invitation to figure out what seems reasonable on 
the unique facts of each case. And even where there is agreement 
that the amendment envisions some baseline rules, it’s also widely 
understood that those rules must bend under some circumstances. 
There’s a risk, then, that judges will come to view rules like the 
probable-cause requirement as little more than weak suggestions, 
capable of being trumped whenever, in a judge’s view, they seem 
like more trouble than they are worth. If so, it becomes all too easy 
for judges to throw up their hands, unwilling to second-guess the 
judgments of police officers. That’s especially true given that most 
Fourth Amendment litigation occurs in the context of suppression 
rulings. In such situations, police actually found evidence of crime; 
to a reviewing court, police choices will often appear sensible in 
retrospect.87
Yet to the extent that the Fourth Amendment actually imposes 
meaningful constraints on police officers, requirements like the 
probable-cause rule must have bite. That is, they must prevent police 
from doing things that they would otherwise do—things that, in a 
world without a Fourth Amendment, might even seem to a judge 
like reasonable things to do. That means judges must not ignore the 
amendment’s commands simply because they make it harder for po-
lice to catch criminals. Judges who do so inappropriately substitute 
their own preferences for the choices made in the Constitution.88 
Avoiding that possibility requires clear rules governing how 
courts should fashion Fourth Amendment doctrine itself—specifi-
cally, principles governing when courts can and should recognize 
exceptions to commands like the probable-cause requirement. By 
way of analogy, consider the First Amendment. America today has 
almost certainly the most speech-protective laws on the planet. 
87 See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 Va. L. Rev. 
881, 911–13 (1991).
88 Cf. John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1939, 1946 (2011) (“An interpreter . . . must not invoke background purpose as 
a way to convert rules into standards or standards into rules.”). 
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That fact is usually attributed to the First Amendment. But the First 
Amendment itself has not done the work. A key element in shaping 
America’s vibrant free-speech culture is the fact that the Supreme 
Court has developed, and continues to refine, legal doctrines that 
preclude courts from deciding what speech merits protection based 
on “an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”89 The 
doctrine not only limits when and why government can restrict 
speech, but also largely prohibits the possibility that courts could 
recognize exceptions to those protections.90
A similar approach for the Fourth Amendment would seek to 
ensure that judicial decisionmaking doesn’t just boil down to ad 
hoc judgments about what seem like reasonable police practices, 
all things considered. What’s necessary are principled and objec-
tive norms about when, exactly, exceptions to baseline rules like the 
probable-cause requirement are permissible. Those norms must cre-
ate some flexibility, but they cannot allow the exceptions to swallow 
the rules themselves and replace them with fact-specific interest bal-
ancing in each case.
Such principles governing proper Fourth Amendment analysis 
are important not merely because they constrain lower courts vis-à-
vis the Supreme Court (although they do);91 as important, over time, 
is their effect in limiting the types of arguments the Supreme Court 
will consider in a given context. In that sense, I submit that such 
rules are critical to taking the Fourth Amendment seriously as law—
that is, as a source of rules that has objective, discernible content 
distinct from a particular judge’s assessments of costs and benefits 
in a specific case.
When it comes to the probable-cause requirement for seizures of 
the person, taking that rule seriously means that judges need to have 
guidance about what kinds of arguments are in bounds and what 
kinds of governmental interests should count as legitimate reasons 
for an exception. If the probable-cause rule—which, by definition, 
89 United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010); see also Brown v. Entertain-
ment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011). 
90 See, e.g., Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734 (rejecting the possibility of “new categories of 
unprotected speech” beyond those previously recognized). 
91 See, e.g., Toby J. Heytens, Doctrine Formulation and Distrust, 83 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 2045, 2057–59 (2008) (explaining how appellate courts use clear rules to constrain 
lower courts). 
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makes the job of police harder—doesn’t apply whenever it makes 
policing more difficult, it is no rule at all. 
Under Justice Scalia’s view, an exception “is only permissible   
where . . . ‘some governmental interest independent of the ordinary 
interest in investigating crime and apprehending suspects’” is at 
stake.92 This assertion seems not quite right as a descriptive matter 
(which may explain why its only cited support is Justice Stewart’s 
dissent in Summers). The Terry doctrine, the most significant excep-
tion to the probable-cause requirement, gives police authority briefly 
to detain and question individuals based only on articulable suspi-
cion, a lower standard than probable cause. And the doctrine’s jus-
tification for those detentions is the ordinary interest in detecting 
and preventing crime.93 (Perhaps Terry is best thought of as less of an 
exception to and more of an application of the probable-cause rule—
when police have a little bit less than probable cause, they can effect a 
brief detention that is much less intrusive than a real arrest. One can 
accept Terry while still largely accepting Justice Scalia’s approach.94)
Putting Terry to one side, however, Justice Scalia’s approach has 
much to recommend it. The Fourth Amendment’s probable-cause re-
quirement reflects a tradeoff between liberty and privacy on the one 
hand and the government’s interest in fighting crime on the other. 
To allow the rule to give way simply because it gets in the way of law 
enforcement would miss the whole point of the rule—it would fail to 
respect the rule as a rule.
92 Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1044 (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 707 (Stewart, J., dissenting)). 
93 To be sure, Terry noted that “more than the governmental interest in investigating 
crime” was present when it analyzed the search (the frisk for weapons) at issue in that 
case, recognizing “the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to 
assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed.” Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968). That interest, however, comes into play only once police have 
detained the person to be questioned. In most instances, it provides no justification for 
the initial seizure, which will typically be motivated solely by the desire to investigate 
potential criminal activity.
94 Justice Scalia’s rationale for permitting Terry stops is that, on his reading of the 
common law, “it had long been considered reasonable to detain suspicious persons 
for the purpose of demanding that they give an account of themselves.” Minnesota 
v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). He has, 
however, expressed skepticism that frisks authorized by Terry have a historical ana-
logue. See id. at 381 (“I frankly doubt . . . whether the fiercely proud men who ad-
opted our Fourth Amendment would have allowed themselves to be subjected, on 
mere suspicion of being armed and dangerous, to such indignity.”). 
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By contrast, permitting exceptions only where the government can 
point to a legitimate reason separate from its ordinary law-enforce-
ment interests—a reason that explains why an exception is justified 
here, but not everywhere—helps prevent the doctrine from sliding 
down that slippery slope. Acknowledging that some strong govern-
ment interest other than the ordinary interest in law enforcement might 
justify a limited exception does not question the balance struck by the 
Fourth Amendment between investigative needs and personal lib-
erty and privacy—it does not effectively “revise the judgment [of] the 
American people . . . that the benefits of [the Fourth Amendment’s] 
restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs.”95
Of course, Justice Scalia’s approach does not take all discretion out 
of judges’ hands. Even where legitimate law-enforcement interests 
potentially justifying an exception exist, courts must balance those 
interests against the intrusions on privacy and liberty that an excep-
tion would create. Fourth Amendment analysis cannot be entirely 
mechanized. Nonetheless, requiring the government to articulate a 
special interest justifying an exception provides a significant con-
straint on judges’ ability to disregard the probable-cause require-
ment whenever it seems inconvenient. And to the extent that the 
probable-cause requirement is a rule worthy of respect, some con-
straint is better than none at all.
The Right Result
In light of the foregoing analysis, Bailey reached the right bot-
tom line. As Justice Scalia correctly concluded in his concurrence, 
the only legitimate interest at stake—the only one that was distinct 
from ordinary law enforcement—was the government’s interest in 
effectuating the search without interference.96 And that interest es-
sentially disappeared as soon as Bailey left the vicinity of his apart-
ment. Accordingly, the normal probable-cause requirement applied 
with full force.
The majority was not so explicit, but its opinion seemed to rec-
ognize that the sweeping array of interests recognized in Summers 
was too broad. Given that the majority acknowledged that both the 
95 Cf. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734 (internal quotation marks omitted; first alteration in 
original). 
96 Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1044–45 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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flight rationale and the government interest in opening locked doors 
and containers would have “no limiting principle” if extended out-
side the immediate vicinity of the home,97 and instead emphasized 
“the law enforcement interests in conducting a safe and efficient 
search,”98 it appeared, more or less, to track Justice Scalia’s analysis. 
By contrast, the reasoning of the many lower courts that relied on 
Summers to uphold detentions of departing occupants demonstrates 
why principled constraints like Justice Scalia’s are needed. Without 
them, judges may be irresistibly tempted to water down probable-
cause requirements whenever they pose an obstacle to police. Take 
the Second Circuit’s assertion that police would be in an “impos-
sible position” if they lacked authority to detain occupants who had 
left the premises.99 Certainly, police executing search warrants after 
Bailey may sometimes face a difficult choice between detaining an 
occupant before he leaves the premises or letting the occupant leave 
and waiting to begin the search. But the choice between those two 
alternatives is not a “Hobson’s choice” simply because the govern-
ment finds both imperfect.100 Police will inevitably face such choices 
because the Fourth Amendment takes certain options off the table. 
The Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Montieth101 
provides another good example of similarly problematic reasoning. 
In that case, police had a warrant to search a home where the de-
fendant, a suspected drug dealer, resided. “In an effort to minimize 
both the trauma to family as well as the safety risks of a search,” 
police officers planned to detain the defendant away from the home 
and then “secure his cooperation to execute the warrant.”102 The 
plan worked; Montieth, once detained, agreed to cooperate with 
the search “to avoid an abrupt or forcible entry into the house while 
his wife and children were inside.”103 Police asked Montieth’s wife 
97 Id. at 1040.
98 Id. at 1042.
99 United States v. Bailey, 652 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2011). 
100 Id. at 206. Indeed, this is not even a proper use of the idiom. A “Hobson’s choice” 
is not a choice between two imperfect alternatives, but is instead “the option of taking 
the one thing offered or nothing.” See “choice, n.,” Oxford English Dictionary Online, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/32111 (accessed Aug. 1, 2013).
101 662 F.3d 660 (4th Cir. 2011).
102 Id. at 663. 
103 Id.
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to leave the home with her children; once the family had departed, 
police brought Montieth into the home and he showed them where 
his drugs were located.104 The Fourth Circuit found this technique 
permissible: “To require officers to bypass less dangerous and dis-
ruptive methods of executing a search warrant and push them to 
harsher and more forcible modes of entry would be at odds with the 
Fourth Amendment’s ultimate command of reasonableness.”105
The Fourth Circuit seemed strangely untroubled by the way po-
lice so obviously wielded their authority under Summers as a cud-
gel to coerce the defendant into revealing the location of his drugs. 
Why was either Montieth’s detention or his consent necessary to 
avoid an “abrupt or forcible entry,”106 given that police could simply 
have asked the family members to leave after Montieth departed? 
The most plausible interpretation, at least to this reader, seems to be 
that police detained Montieth away from the residence precisely so 
they could threaten him with an unnecessarily violent entry into the 
home, with its ensuing trauma to his wife and children (perhaps the 
police would even have placed them in handcuffs too), in order to get 
him to agree to cooperate with their investigation. Montieth, then, is 
an especially stark example of how courts sometimes decline to fol-
low the probable-cause requirement when police show that adhering 
to it would make their jobs more difficult. 
Justice Breyer’s dissent, for the most part, added little to the argu-
ments previously made by the Second Circuit and other courts that 
adopted the “as soon as reasonably practicable” rule. He endorsed   
all of the interests recognized in Summers, including the flight in-
terest, without seriously engaging Justice Scalia’s arguments or ex-
plaining why, in his view, those interests were legitimate.107 The best 
justification he could muster for his rule was that it was possible an 
emerging occupant might notice officers preparing to execute the 
warrant and then notify those inside the house, who in turn could 
flee with or destroy the evidence or prepare to attack officers as they   
enter the home.108 This particular argument, at least, relies on law- 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 667. 
106 Id. 
107 Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1046–47 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
108 Id. at 1047–48.
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enforcement interests that are distinct from “ordinary” ones. But it is 
nonetheless unpersuasive. 
First of all, the argument relies on a sequence of speculative pos-
sibilities: “[T]hose emerging occupants might have seen the officers 
outside the house. And they might have alerted others inside the 
house. . . . Suppose that an individual inside the house (perhaps 
under the influence of drugs) had grabbed the gun and begun to 
fire through the window.”109 Simply because a judge can concoct a 
hypothetical scenario in which adhering to a Fourth Amendment 
rule could conceivably fail to prevent harm cannot be enough, in and 
of itself, to justify an exception to that rule. The situation must be at 
least somewhat likely to occur in order to justify a blanket exception 
from a general Fourth Amendment rule, and Justice Breyer’s elabo-
rate hypothetical was anything but. 
Putting that objection to one side, however, there’s an even more 
basic problem: It’s not at all clear how allowing police to detain a 
recent occupant a mile away from the premises would prevent the harm 
Justice Breyer postulated. If, indeed, Bailey had noticed police out-
side his apartment—he didn’t—and if there had been a confederate 
of Bailey’s inside the apartment—there wasn’t—and if Bailey had 
intended to alert that person as to an imminent search so that he 
could destroy evidence or arm himself—why on earth would Bailey 
have waited until he was nearly a mile away from his apartment to 
phone or text a warning? Wouldn’t he (or his passenger) have done 
so almost immediately, in which case detaining Bailey after he had 
driven for several minutes would have done nothing to prevent the 
sequence of events Justice Breyer worried about? That this was Jus-
tice Breyer’s strongest argument is perhaps all the evidence needed 
to show that his position was wrong on the merits. 
A Missed Opportunity
Although the Court reached the correct result in Bailey, both 
the majority opinion and Justice Scalia’s concurrence are, in one 
way, frustrating: The reasoning in each, if followed to its conclu-
sion, would require narrowing the Summers rule itself. Yet neither 
the majority nor the concurrence was willing even to suggest that 
possibility.
109 Id.
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Take the majority opinion first. In purporting to apply the Summers 
interests, the Court subtly modified them. It emphasized that police 
have an interest in maintaining their own safety during the search, 
but recognized that occupants who are not inside the home during 
the search pose much less risk.110 It cited the interest in “the orderly 
completion of the search” but emphasized that “[i]f occupants are 
permitted to wander around the premises, there is the potential for 
interference with the execution of the search warrant” while largely 
dismissing  Summers’s acknowledged interest in opening locked 
doors and containers.111 And it reduced the flight interest to one that 
“serves to preserve the integrity of the search by controlling those 
persons who are on the scene. If police officers are concerned about 
flight, and have to keep close supervision of occupants who are not 
restrained, they might rush the search, causing unnecessary damage 
to property or compromising its careful execution.”112
Yet if Bailey is correct about which government interests are prop-
erly relevant, it’s difficult to understand why the Summers rule is as 
broad as it is. Why, if the legitimate law-enforcement justifications 
boil down to the interest in maintaining control over the site of the 
search, shouldn’t police have to give an occupant the choice between 
leaving freely (in which case the occupant, like Bailey, would not be 
in a position to wander through the home, harm officers, destroy 
evidence, or otherwise interfere with the search) or remaining in the 
home but being detained (which would preclude any interference)? 
Indeed, Summers himself was detained outside his home, while he 
was in the process of leaving; given that fact, it’s far from clear that 
the legitimate interests Bailey relied on actually shake out differently 
on the facts of the two cases. 
The Court took the position that there was something magical 
about the line demarcating the “immediate vicinity” of the prem-
ises. But it seems like the more sensible line, for purposes of the de-
tention power, would be between those who choose to remain pres-
ent at the site of the search and those who do not. Of course, there’s 
a possibility that a person who chooses to leave the site of a search 
might later return and harm police. But as Bailey explained, police 
110 Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1039. 
111 Id. at 1040. 
112 Id. 
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could “mitigate that risk . . . by taking routine precautions, for in-
stance by erecting barricades or posting someone on the perimeter 
or at the door.”113
Drawing the constitutional line between occupants who choose 
to remain and those who do not has two key virtues. First, it’s easier 
to administer than the majority’s line. There is no need to evaluate 
“the lawful limits of the premises, whether the occupant was within 
the line of sight of his dwelling,” or “the ease of reentry from the oc-
cupant’s location.”114 Second, and more importantly, it avoids intru-
sions on liberty that—as the Court’s opinion in Bailey tells us—are 
justified by no government interest that should legitimately trump 
the Fourth Amendment’s presumptive requirements. 
Justice Scalia can usually be relied upon for candor, especially 
when writing separately; he is more willing than most justices are 
to criticize precedent.115 Yet he too declined to question the Sum-
mers rule despite implicitly recognizing its flaws. He criticized the 
Court’s opinion in Summers for setting forth a “smorgasbord” of in-
terests, only one of which (“carrying out the search unimpeded by 
violence or other disruptions”) he deemed legitimate.116 But he ac-
cepted the substance of the original Summers rule and the majority’s 
“immediate vicinity” limitation without qualification. And he did so 
even though, as explained above, the interest in executing the search 
free of disruptions would seem to justify only a narrower power to 
detain those who choose to remain on premises. More’s the pity; an 
opinion by Justice Scalia questioning the Summers rule could have 
laid the groundwork for its rollback in a later case.117
There are times, of course, when it is not worth revisiting past de-
cisions. Perhaps we should be grateful that the Court declined to 
extend a dubious precedent into new territory and leave it at that. 
Summers, however, seems especially deserving of reconsideration. 
The intrusions on liberty that it authorizes are significant. Although 
Summers asserted that detentions pursuant to search warrants are 
113 133 S. Ct. at 1039.
114 Id. at 1042.
115 See, e.g., Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 630–32 (2004) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (criticizing Belton). 
116 Bailey, 133 S. Ct. at 1044 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
117 Cf. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344–43 (2009) (limiting Belton and endorsing 
Justice Scalia’s separate opinion in Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004)). 
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less intrusive than arrests, it’s clear today that that isn’t so. Why 
should the government have a categorical power to keep an occupant 
of a home in handcuffs for hours during a search—like in Muehler v. 
Mena—simply because she had the bad luck to be within the “imme-
diate vicinity” of her home when police showed up to perform the 
search? Why couldn’t police ensure the integrity of the search scene 
and their own safety by giving her the opportunity to leave before 
starting the search? 
Second, the moment seems especially ripe for the Court to do more 
than it has to rein in, or at least question, aggressive police search 
tactics. As journalist Radley Balko has ably demonstrated, violent, 
military-style SWAT team raids are becoming the norm when po-
lice execute search warrants—even for minor crimes.118 Such tactics 
lead to trauma, injuries, and sometimes death for residents of the 
homes being searched—many of whom turn out to be innocent of 
any crime. Although Bailey did not deal with such a fact pattern, 
now might have been as good a time as any to suggest to police that 
their need to “exercise unquestioned command”119 during a search 
must be balanced against the constitutional rights of those present at 
homes being searched. 
Despite the foregoing criticism of Bailey’s specifics, however, I 
don’t mean to lose sight of all that is good about Bailey—for there 
is much to like. Bailey got the correct result, and in doing so both 
the majority and the concurrence approached the case the right way, 
focusing attention on what made the search-warrant context special, 
rather than relying on reasoning that could undercut the probable-
cause requirement across the board. And although the Court didn’t 
say anything explicitly to undermine the breadth of the Summers 
rule, it’s possible someday that Bailey’s reasoning—which, as noted, 
significantly undermines Summers itself—will eventually lead to the 
Court’s narrowing the Summers rule. Perhaps, as Justice Scalia re-
cently predicted in a dissent in a different Fourth Amendment case, 
“At the end of the day, logic will out.”120 We can only hope. 
118 See generally Radley Balko, Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of Amer-
ica’s Police Forces (2013). 
119 Summers, 452 U.S. at 703.
120 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1989 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in 
original). 
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Conclusion: The Bigger Picture
Much more important than the result in Bailey itself is what the 
case demonstrates about the current state of Fourth Amendment 
doctrine. Consider the difference between Summers and Bailey. Sum-
mers relied on an incoherent mishmash of government interests 
to justify the detention in that case. And it suggested no limiting 
principle to ensure that exceptions can’t swallow the probable-cause 
requirement entirely. In Bailey, by contrast, six justices recognized, 
implicitly or explicitly, the need for principled limits for exceptions 
to Fourth Amendment rules. 
And Bailey is no isolated example. Just four years ago, Gant sig-
nificantly narrowed the Belton rule. And consider some of the deci-
sions from just the last two terms. In United States v. Jones, the Court 
unanimously concluded that police installation of a GPS device on 
a vehicle constituted a search.121 So is the use of a drug-sniffing dog 
on the porch of a house, according to Florida v. Jardines.122 Missouri 
v. McNeely rejected a per se rule that nonconsensual blood tests in 
drunken-driving cases always constitute exigent circumstances 
making a warrant unnecessary.123
At least part of the credit for these results belongs to a renewed 
interest on the Court in looking to the Fourth Amendment for clear 
principles that can be applied to individual cases—what I call tak-
ing the amendment seriously as law. Gant insisted that exceptions to 
the probable-cause requirement for searches cannot become unte-
thered from their legitimate justifications. Rather than conducting 
fuzzy balancing tests, Jones and Jardines both rested on property-law 
rationales. A “property-rights baseline” doesn’t let the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment’s protection depend on judges’ assessments of 
societal interests in privacy but instead “keeps easy cases easy.”124 
A plurality in McNeely hewed to previously recognized Fourth 
Amendment principles, rejecting a “modified per se rule” in favor of 
the traditional exigent circumstances doctrine.125 
121 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
122 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417–18 (2013). 
123 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1563 (2013).
124 Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417. 
125 133 S. Ct. at 1563 (plurality op.). 
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And while Maryland v. King declared that DNA testing of all those 
arrested for serious offenses is reasonable,126 perhaps what’s surpris-
ing about that case is that the vote was so close. Many people have 
gut reactions that the government’s crime-solving interest strongly 
outweighs the privacy intrusion to arrestees of having their cheeks 
swabbed. Yet Justice Scalia’s dissent was one vote away from de-
claring such searches impermissible. What’s more, the majority felt 
compelled to argue the case on the dissent’s terms. Thirty years ago, 
the Court might simply have balanced the interests and declared the 
swabs reasonable in light of the government’s strong interest in solv-
ing crimes, notwithstanding the lack of articulable suspicion. Today, 
however, the Court had to at least try to come up with justifications 
(such as “identifying arrestees”127) distinct from the ordinary inter-
est in solving crime (although its attempt to do so was not particu-
larly persuasive).128 
The Fourth Amendment developments highlighted here should 
be seen as part of a broader effort on the Court in recent years, led 
by Justice Scalia, to be more rigorous about identifying and consis-
tently enforcing the specific rights protected by constitutional pro-
visions governing the criminal process. The Court has recognized 
that what the Confrontation Clause protects is not “reliability” writ 
large, but instead the specific right to confront those who bear tes-
timony against you.129 The right to a criminal jury means that all 
findings necessary to increase the maximum sentence authorized by 
law must be made by a jury, regardless of whether those findings 
are labeled “elements” or “sentencing factors.”130 Violations of the 
Sixth Amendment right to one’s chosen counsel cannot be declared 
harmless whenever the defendant receives a fair trial, for “[t]he right 
to counsel of choice . . . commands not that a trial be fair, but that a 
particular guarantee of fairness be provided—to wit, that the accused be 
126 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
127 Id. at 1976.
128 Similarly, Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington upheld the 
right of prison officials to conduct strip searches of arrestees who enter into a jail’s 
general population based on the government’s prison-specific security interests. 132 
S. Ct. 1510, 1520 (2012).
129 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–62 (2004) (overruling Ohio v. Roberts, 
448 U.S. 56 (1980)).
130 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000). 
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defended by the counsel he believes to be best.”131 As Bailey demon-
strates, that movement has made great inroads into Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine. Although one can certainly argue about some of the 
specifics,132 as a general matter that development is welcome—at 
least for those who believe that the Fourth Amendment should im-
pose real constraints on police action.
 This isn’t to say that defenders of a robust Fourth Amendment 
have no reason to worry. Recent cases may conceal underlying 
disagreement over remedial questions; although Justice Scalia has 
forged a coalition with Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, he 
almost certainly disagrees with them on the scope—perhaps even 
the legitimacy—of the exclusionary rule.133 Moreover, Justice Scalia 
will not be on the Court forever, and the next generation of conserva-
tive justices seems to have less interest in a principled approach to 
Fourth Amendment analysis. That’s especially true of Justice Alito, 
who has yet to demonstrate that he believes that the Fourth Amend-
ment imposes meaningful constraints on police. Nor is the liberal 
bloc solid; Justice Breyer’s pragmatic methodology has seemed re-
cently to be leading him to favor the government on Fourth Amend-
ment issues.134 The pendulum could certainly swing back. 
 That uncertain future aside, however, Bailey shows how much 
the Court’s approach has changed since the days of Belton, Summers, 
and similar cases. Freeform, all-things-considered reasonableness 
assessments are out of fashion. The Court is taking that “doggone 
Fourth Amendment”135 seriously as a source of binding rules. 
131 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006) (emphasis added).
132 See supra note 86 (discussing disagreement over whether Fourth Amendment 
doctrine incorporates common-law rules).
133 See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (Scalia, J.) (holding, over four 
dissenting votes, including that of Justice Ginsburg, that violations of knock-and- 
announce requirement do not require suppression). 
134 This past term, Justice Breyer sided with the prosecution in every divided Fourth 
Amendment case: Bailey, King, McNeely, and Jardines; earlier, he had also dissented in 
Gant. 
135 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 53, at 57.
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